



All Guns Blazing!

Newsletter of the Naval Wargames Society

No. 266 – December 2016

EDITORIAL

End of the Year again. The NWS relies on the voluntary efforts of its Members to run the club, produce articles for AGB and Battlefleet and run naval games at conventions and the Naval Wargames Weekend. So thank you to those who have helped in ways large and small. Many hands make light work. This year saw the centenary of “Jutland” and the Naval Game in the Heritage Area of HM Naval Base Portsmouth back in May would not have happened without the work put in by Stuart Machin. Dave Sharp is organising the Naval Games Weekend in 2017, taking over from David Manley. See below for the first details. My predecessor described Rob Morgan as “prolific” and I concur. I currently hold several articles from Rob which will appear in AGB over the coming months.

So Happy Christmas to you all. Roll on 2017. I always thought it would take a lot longer to get this old.

Norman Bell.



HMS SEARCHER somewhere in the Atlantic WWII.



USS ARIZONA. Trumpeter Model Kit 1/350 built by Louis Carabott, Malta.

Members who like near future wargames will have to scratch build the Type 26 Frigate for a while as it will probably be some time before manufacturers produce anything – or perhaps you know different?



Computer Generated Image of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, which is due to come into service after 2020 to be used in combat and counter piracy operations and to support humanitarian and disaster relief work around the world

[Crown Copyright]

Books I have read in 2016 and can thoroughly recommend:

Jutland 1916: Twelve Hours to Win the War by Angus Konstam.

Jutland The Unfinished Battle by Nicholas Jellicoe.

Jutland The Naval Staff Appreciation edited by William Schleihauf additional text by Stephen McLaughlin.

A Cold Night in June by Sergeant Robert Lofthouse. (subject: 3 Para and the Falklands Battle of Mount Longdon)

The Yompers by Ian Gardiner. (subject: 45 Commando and the Battle for Two Sisters)

The Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916¹

The Battle of Jutland was the largest naval action in the First World War with the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, turning back the Imperial German High Sea Fleet under Vice Admiral Reinhard von Scheer. The Royal Navy's fleet consisted of 151 ships manned by around 60,000 personnel, 10% of whom were Royal Marines.² The German Fleet had 99 ships manned by 45,000 sailors. During the battle the RN lost 14 ships and suffered 6,784 casualties, 90% of them killed; German losses were 11 ships and 3,058 casualties, 83% of them killed.³ This was therefore also the single day with the greatest number of fatalities for either navy in their histories.

Before the First World War the Royal Navy had provided guaranteed access for Britain to the underlying 'world wide web' of global trade delivered by merchant ships, the largest numbers of which were also British. From 1898 Germany sought to build a major navy but the short-range battleships that made up the majority of the fleet were blatantly aimed at challenging the Royal Navy around Britain's coasts. Britain's response was to concentrate the fleet in home waters, improve relations with France and Russia and accelerate both the quantity and the quality of ships. This began with the revolutionary battleship HMS *Dreadnought* in 1906, which was larger than all its predecessors and could engage at long range with its 10 x 12 inch guns. The revolution reached full maturity with the *Queen Elizabeth* class fast battleships which now had 8 x 15 inch guns and were powered by oil, which was more efficient than the coal power of previous ships and also more economic in manpower. Germany was unable to match these developments in numbers or capabilities, with their ship more weighted to armour-plate than offensive armament and usually one gun calibre behind the RN.

With the outbreak of war Germany was immediately blockaded in its home ports by the Royal Navy. Smaller units and mines sealed the English Channel and allowed the Army to deploy to France and be maintained there. The larger ships were based at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys to prevent German ships using the wider exits from the North Sea to access the shipping that sustained Britain's war and brought the winning edge of millions of troops from the Commonwealth and India and, from 1917, the USA. Without a link home German surface raiders, at sea when war commenced, were fugitives rather than guerrillas and were largely hunted down by the end of 1914. Therefore in 1916 the maritime situation was hugely in Britain's favour and its advantages were growing. Admiral Jellicoe was keen to destroy the German fleet but had to balance that against the risks of fighting German ships at night or at close range

¹ For Germany this was the Battle of the Skagerrak. Sporadic fighting continued until 0215 1 June.

² The RN included personnel from across the Commonwealth. The Grand Fleet also known to have included one Russian officer and three Japanese officers, one of whom was killed in action, as well as an Army officer who privately travelled to join the fleet having had a premonition of the battle.

³ RM casualties were 589 with 526 killed, again approximately 10%.

where darkness, mines and torpedoes could neutralise his advantages and cause heavy losses. He was the first commander since Lord Howard fighting the Armada in 1588 to have all the first class ships of the navy under his command, hence Churchill's comment that he was, 'the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon.'⁴

In this context Admiral Scheer carried out a series of sweeps in the North Sea, seeking to encounter a part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it, thus evening his odds against the RN, as well as gaining a psychological boost. His first ships sailed on such as sweep at 0100 on 31 May 1916. However the RN was already at sea as a result of the superiority of Royal Navy signals intelligence, though inexperience with exploiting this meant it did not provide as much advantage as it could have done. Sailing after dark the ships avoided ambushes by German submarines loitering close to their bases at Scapa and Rosyth.

In an era predating radar and electronic aids, positions were approximate and locating enemy, and sometimes friendly, forces was challenging. In a position around 56 degrees North and 5 degrees East a neutral Danish steamer was investigated by the scouting forces of both fleets and at 1440Z the light cruiser HMS *Galatea* signalled 'Enemy in Sight'. The heaviest units of the Grand Fleet's scouting force were six battlecruisers under the command of Vice Admiral David Beatty. They engaged and pursued the five German battlecruisers to the south-east, both sides opening fire at 1548.⁵ Beatty also had temporarily under his command a squadron of four *Queen Elizabeth* class battleships which urgently tried to join the action, having been furthest from the original encounter and delayed by both the fragility of signalling and a lack of integration training. At 1602 *Indefatigable* was hit and lost due to a secondary explosion with over 1,000 deaths and only two survivors. At 1626 HMS *Queen Mary* was similarly lost with over 1,200 deaths. At this point Beatty remarked to his flag captain, "There is something wrong with our bloody ships today." Later in the battle a third battlecruiser, *Invincible*, would be lost in a similar explosion, again with over 1,000 deaths. These three ship losses amounted to half the Royal Navy's casualties at Jutland. Various explanations have been proposed but the evidence is strongly that ammunition handling had been compromised in pursuit of a higher rate of fire particularly in the battlecruiser force which, forward deployed to Rosyth to react to German raids, had less opportunity for gunnery practice. Beatty's flagship *Lion* was almost certainly saved by the safety procedures imposed by WO Gunner A C Grant and the actions of the mortally wounded Major Francis Harvey RMLI in ordering the flooding of Q turret magazine after the turret was hit.⁶

However with the *Queen Elizabeths* now in action the German battlecruisers were under significant pressure. This altered at around 1638 when the main German fleet arrived and the 'run to the south' became the 'run to the north' with the British units retreating and Scheer believing he had a chance to destroy a major part of the RN. British gunnery, particularly from the *Queen Elizabeths* pounded the leading German ships but without achieving catastrophic destruction. Yet the German fleet was unwittingly racing towards Jellicoe's superior forces. Jellicoe was frustrated by a lack of information; receiving no signals from Beatty between 1645 and 1800 but at 1815 applied his judgement and made "the Royal Navy's most important tactical decision of the twentieth century."⁷ He signalled his 24 battleships to deploy from cruising columns to a single gun line to the east and seven minutes later they crossed the German T, concentrating their fire on the column of the German fleet.⁸ Scheer's fleet was now silhouetted, his intention completely frustrated and his fleet faced annihilation. He therefore executed a special manoeuvre his fleet had trained for the '*Gefechtskehrtwendung*' or 'battle about turn' which allowed a rapid reversal and broke contact at 1842 after twenty minutes of fire. Once out of range he turned east and then blundered into Jellicoe's line again as he positioned his fleet between the German force and its bases. By this point it seems likely Scheer was suffering from psychological shock, later admitting, "My idea? I had no idea... The thing just happened..."⁹ The action lasted from 1900 to 1945 with the RN achieving 37 large calibre hits, mainly on the battlecruisers, against none for the German forces. Scheer avoided destruction by exploiting the gathering dusk and smog and by ordering his destroyers to make a torpedo attack. Jellicoe turned away, preventing any losses to his battleships but at the cost of breaking off the action. Jellicoe continued to avoid a night action but prepared to renew the battle at dawn. Smaller sporadic and confused actions continued into the night but Jellicoe's captains frequently failed to report them limiting his situational

⁴ Nelson at Trafalgar had around 20% of the RN ships of the line under his command.

⁵ Battlecruisers were ships of battleship size and armament but which achieved higher speed through less armoured protection (25 knots v 20 for battleships). Their original purpose was to overwhelm cruisers raiding commerce. The battlecruiser HMAS *Australia* was in refit during the battle.

⁶ Grant was later captain of *Victory* during the Second World War. Major Harvey was awarded a posthumous VC.

⁷ Andrew Gordon "Jellicoe: Jutland, 1916" in Eric Grove (Ed) *Great Battle of the Royal Navy* (Godalming: Arms & Armour Press, 1998), 174.

⁸ One of the battleships was HMS *Collingwood* in which was serving HRH Sub Lt Prince Albert, the future George VI. He was serving at sea despite gastric problems could well have limited him to shore service and saw Jutland as a defining moment in his life. George V simply commented, "I am pleased with my son."

⁹ Quoted in Paul Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (London: UCL Press, 1994), 322.

awareness and significant signals intelligence about German zeppelin airship reconnaissance was not passed on to him by the Admiralty. By dawn Scheer's fleet had slipped past him to return to Germany.

Jutland remains a controversial battle. Germany rapidly claimed victory, citing the loss of 14 RN ships compared to 11 German and the fact that British human casualties were double that of her opponent. For Britain and a Royal Navy with expectations set against the impossibly high bar of Trafalgar these claims had some resonance. However the fundamentals remained that the German fleet had been completely frustrated in its object; had fled the battlefield and was subsequently even more cautious in its ever more limited subsequent sorties. The German Navy had, "assaulted its jailer but was still in jail," Frustrated both by this reality and Britain's demonstration of its ability, at the Battle of the Somme, to fight a relentless *Materialschlacht* or "material battle" Germany was driven to attempt an unrestricted submarine campaign, bringing the USA into the war and decisively turning the war towards the victory in 1918. A much improved Anglo-American Grand Fleet never had another opportunity to confront the High Sea Fleet but it did supervise its internment at Scapa that year.¹⁰ It was a less satisfying victory than Trafalgar but was equally profound and significant.¹¹

Stephen Prince,

D Hd Naval Staff & Head of Naval Historical Branch.

Appendix Fleet Strengths at Jutland (ship losses in Red & Italics)

	RN - Grand Fleet	German High Seas Fleet
Dreadnought BB	28	16
Pre-Dreadnought BB	-	6 (1)
Battlecruisers	9 (3)	5 (1)
Armoured Cruisers	8 (3)	-
Light Cruisers	26	11(4)
Destroyers	78 (8)	61(5)
Minelayer	1	
Seaplane Carrier	1	

Victoria Crosses Awarded for Jutland

Cdr the Hon Edward Bingham, CO HMS *Nestor* and 13th Destroyer Flotilla, for 'the extremely gallant way in which he led his division in their attack' and well as his conduct as his ship was sinking. He was awarded his VC while a POW in Germany.

Boy First Class Jack Cornwell, Gunnery sight-setter HMS *Chester*, who remained at his post while mortally wounded. Born 8 January 1900 and joined Raleigh 27 July 1915, joining *Chester* 1 May 1916. Buried Manor Park Cemetery, East Ham, London.

Cdr Loftus William Jones, CO HMS *Shark*, who continued to man a gun after the ship had been extensively damaged and he had been wounded. He remained in command even after he had lost a leg and was lost when *Shark* sank. He was buried in Sweden after his body washed ashore.

Major Francis Harvey RM Light Infantry, HMS *Lion*, for ordering the flooding of his turret's magazines while mortally wounded.

¹⁰ The Royal Navy interned a second fleet, Italy's, at Malta in September 1943.

¹¹ When Admiral Sir Philip Vian was invited to the 50th anniversary commemorations of Jutland (he had been a Sub Lt in the destroyer *Morning Star*) he declined on the grounds he "found the battle wholly unenjoyable and frustrating."

“U Boat Leader”, “GATO Leader”, “The Hunters”, “The Hunted” and “Silent Victory” are all boxed Submarine Games with high quality parts but prices to match. Perhaps you have one of these games and can write a review or AAR for AGB. Longer Items can go into “Battlefleet”. If you are thinking of taking the plunge and buying one of the games you may wish to consider either the very basic “Target Bearing 093 Degrees” or the basic “Operation Drumbeat”, first. Dip a toe into the water, so to speak, before spending the big bucks. You can then add a few rules to beef up these games and/or move up to the big brothers.

http://www.wargamevault.com/product/93080/Target-Bearing-093-degrees?term=target+&test_epoch=0

<http://www.wargamevault.com/product/106976/Operation-Drumbeat>



The crew of USS Detroit (LCS 7) brought its ship to life before a crowd of nearly 6,500 in front of the iconic General Motors building at the Port of Detroit.

The ship was officially placed in commission by Adm. Phil Davidson, commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, who remarked, "When a ship is commissioned she is placed in service of the American people and is given the charge to do one thing: to execute the Navy's mission - to be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained combat incident to operations at sea."



Two F-35B Lightning II aircraft land on the flight deck aboard the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6). The F-35B short take off/vertical landing (STOVL) variant is the world's first supersonic STOVL stealth aircraft. USS America, with Marine Operational

Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1), Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA-211) and Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23) embarked, are underway conducting operational testing and the third phase of developmental testing for the F-35B Lightning II aircraft, respectively. The tests will evaluate the full spectrum of joint strike fighter measures of suitability and effectiveness in an at-sea environment. U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Kyle Goldberg.



Peter the Great. (Pyotr Velikij).



Admiral Kuznetsov

The Russian ships were mentioned in November's AGB. These photographs were taken by NWS Member, Mike Kirk, who lives near the Straits of Dover.

The flotilla will be off the coast of Syria by the time you read this. After re-fuelling at sea in the Mediterranean. (Spain denied permission to come into port) Russia's defence ministry says two of its navy destroyers forced away a Dutch submarine to stop it spying on the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Russian defence spokesman Igor Konashenkov said that two anti-submarine ships, Severomorsk and Vice-Admiral Kulakov, had "easily identified the submarine 20km away using the standard on-board hydro-acoustics systems and data obtained from anti-submarine helicopters". The naval group includes a nuclear-powered battle cruiser, two anti-submarine warships and four support vessels, probably escorted by submarines. The battle group has joined about 10 other Russian vessels already off the Syrian coast.



The Royal Navy's attack on Taranto in November 1940 heralded a new age of warfare. With the enormous demands of a global war beginning to tell, the British capital ships were simply too thinly spread for a large fleet action against Taranto, where the bulk of the Italian fleet lay menacingly. How was the Royal Navy to eliminate the threat of the Regia Marina? This is the story of one of World War II's most devastating raids, recounting how a handful of obsolete Fairey Swordfish biplanes swooped in and destroyed an Italian battleship and badly damaged two more. This book explains the origins of the attack, its planning and execution, and what happened in the aftermath.

Osprey Publishing has many high standard books, one of which is their Book on "Taranto". In November, the 76th anniversary of the raid was a good excuse (if one was needed) to dig out my copy of Minden Games', "Swordfish at Taranto". Having failed to emulate the success of the original raid with my previous allocations of aircraft to targets, I decided for the first time to; re-create the start of the original attack – easy as the Minden Game Notes includes historical info.



Swordfish at Taranto pits you (playing the British) and your raiding force of Fairey Swordfish bombers against the Italian ships and harbor defense of Taranto, November 1940.

In this solitaire "experience game", you must plan the raid, brief the pilots, equip the planes with a mix of torpedoes/bombs/flares, and then sit back and watch the drama unfold. Counters represent individual planes (and pilots); targets are individual Italian warships at anchor.

The actual raid saw twenty Swordfish deliver a crippling blow to the Italian Mediterranean fleet; can you do as well or better?

An abridged AAR, as space is limited.

L5Q Morford from Wave 2 Returned to Carrier. The defences are on regular alert status. The main harbour (Mar Grande) is protected by partially deployed anti-torpedo nets. Barrage balloons on aircraft destroying cables are deployed to the South and North West.

1 st Wave Plane and Pilot	Armament	Approach from	Target	Result of Nov 2016 Replay
L4A Williamson	Torpedo	SW	Ships in main harbour (East)	Engine miss-firing but Wave leader decides to press on. Flying between unseen balloon cables, torpedo hits Cavour for minor damage and just like the actual raid the aircraft is shot down.
L4k Kemp	Torpedo	NW	Ships in main harbour (West)	Flies between cables, lines up on Duilio but misses from close range. Returns to ILLUSTRIOUS safely.
L4F Maund	Torpedo	NW	Ships in main harbour (West)	Flies between cables, lines up on Littorio, torpedo misses, aircraft receives heavy damage from the ack but makes it safely back to ILLUSTRIOUS.
L4P Kiggell	Flares, Bombs	SE	Illuminate Ships, bomb Oil Storage Facility	Perfect drop of flares illuminates Ships in the Mar Grande. Aircraft hit by ack ack and bombs miss the OSF,
L5B Lamb	Flares, Bombs	SE	Illuminate Ships, bomb Oil Storage Facility	Faulty flares do not ignite. Bomb dropped on OSF.
L4C Sparke	Torpedo	SW	Ships in main harbour (East)	A navigation error brings the 'plane in late, the torpedo misses the A Doria. Safe return with light damage.
L4R Macauley	Torpedo	SW	Ships in main harbour (East)	Hit by ack ack, the attack run is spoilt. The torpedo misses the Cavour and the aircraft limps back for a safe recovery, just.
L4M Swayne	Torpedo	W	Ships in main harbour (East)	Lines up on Cesare but misses. Returns safely.
E5A Patch	Bombs	N	Ships in inner harbour	A CA in the inner harbour, Mar Piccolo is near missed. Safe return.
L4L Sarra	Bombs	NE	Seaplane Base	Minor damage to Seaplane Base.

L4H Forde	Bombs	N	Ships in inner harbour	Hit by ack ack the aircraft misses the ship mast and the bomb near misses a CA.
E5Q Murray	Bombs	N	Ships in inner harbour	Not seen by the air defence gunners, a perfect approach fails to result in any hits on a CA.
				A poor first wave result. Now the second wave sweeps in.
2 nd Wave				
L5A Hale	Torpedo	NW	Ships in main harbour (West)	Attack on Duilio pressed home through heavy ack ack and the torpedo slams into the Ship. Safe return.
E4H Bayley	Torpedo	NW	Ships in main harbour (West)	Attack on Duilio pressed home through heavy ack ack and the torpedo slams into the Ship. Internal explosions and fires. Ship fatally damaged. Safe return.
L5H Lea	Torpedo	NW	Ships in main harbour (West)	Torpedo dropped at short range and misses Littorio. Aircraft returns with light damage.
E5H Welham	Torpedo	N	Ships in main harbour (West)	Fierce anti-aircraft fire drives off the aircraft which now drops torpedo aimed at a CA in the Mar Piccolo. A hit!
L5K Torrens-Spence	Torpedo	NW	Ships in main harbour (West)	Unseen approach on Littorio. Torpedo causes major damage.
L5B Hamilton	Flares, Bombs	SE	Illuminate Ships, bomb Oil Storage Facility	A perfect flare drop but bombs miss the OSF.
L4F Skelton	Flares, Bombs	SE	Illuminate Ships, bomb Oil Storage Facility	A perfect flare drop followed by major damage to the OSF.
L5F Clifford	Bombs	SW	Ships in main harbour (East)	Light damage on approach. Bombs near miss A Doria. Safe return.

A terrible first wave but the second wave came good. One less aircraft shot down compared to the actual raid but the replay was only two thirds as successful as the actual raid.

Review of *Skagerrak: The Battle of Jutland Through German Eyes* by Gary Staff, published by Pen and Sword, £25. Reviewed by Peter Colbeck

I really dislike this book. I dislike it for so many reasons that I think I can readily start with what many might regard as the most trivial: I find its layout quite oppressive. The page margins are very narrow and the reader is presented with a dense mass of text leaving very little white space. Furthermore, the text is not broken up in any reader-friendly way. For example, the first chapter documents the activities of the High Seas Fleet over the first four months of 1916. Valuable and interesting though this information might be, being presented as a solid, unbroken slab of approximately 10,000 words makes it almost inaccessible to the reader. The author certainly has no interest in making it easy. The same applies to the maps: I did try to give Gary Staff the benefit of the doubt by presenting the maps to a much younger pair of eyes than my own, but she agreed with me that the details in some of the maps are far too small, making them illegible and useless. He does, however, want to assure us of the authenticity of his research: whereas the British employed submarines and battlecruisers, we find the Germans embarking in *U-bootes* and *panzerkreuzer*. Is that really necessary in an English-language book? To me, it is just pretentious. And all the more frustrating as it is applied inconsistently!

The author also quotes extensively from German sources. After all, that's the whole point of the book – to present Jutland from a German point of view. I suppose that justifies the presentation of distances in hectometres, though that is still mildly irritating. I don't see how it justifies repetition, though. On page 48 we are given an extensive quote from an officer on the *Lutzow*. Only three pages later, a 47 word snippet from the same quote is repeated. Why?

Another annoying aspect is that in the strategic discussions, he quotes the German reports of sightings in the German grid system without giving us a map showing where these grid cells are, nor any idea of how large they are, so this is meaningless to the reader.

When we come to the great battle itself, we are fed a forensic hit by hit account of the engagements. This is meticulously detailed and a valuable piece of research, in the right place, but as a discussion of the German view of Jutland, it is just another way of bulking out the book and making it difficult to any but the most dedicated reader. However, part way through this we get to the real meat of the book. Gary Staff argues for the brilliant and aggressive way in which Speer used his ships, in comparison to the unimaginative and pedestrian Jellicoe. This is, in fact, just another spin on the Jellicoe versus Beatty argument and I declare that I am firmly in the Jellicoe camp. Speer had nothing to lose. The High Seas Fleet was hardly ever at sea, thanks to the over-protective Kaiser, and was outnumbered. This situation could hardly be made worse, but could be made better by a bold and unexpected move. Jellicoe was keenly aware of his ability to 'lose the war in an afternoon' as Churchill was later to say, and therefore had every reason to proceed cautiously while trying to make best use of his overwhelming numbers. While Staff (retired airline pilot) argues that Speer displayed tactical brilliance, others, such as

Andrew Gordon (naval historian with a PhD in War Studies) says 'Sir John [Jellicoe]...was in decisive control of the 'battle space'' whereas Speer (quoting his flag lieutenant) 'had scarcely "the foggiest idea of what was happening"' (p.441, *The Rules of the Game*).

Staff goes on to suggest that the well-established views of Jutland as a strategic victory for the British is worthless as it was not (in his view) a tactical victory. 'What good are strategic victories?' he seems to argue. Surely the alternative view is valid: what good is a tactical victory if you fail to build on it? The Grand Fleet was famously ready for action the following day; the High Seas Fleet rarely put to sea again. The British naval blockade continued to be effective and thorough, contributing significantly to hardship on the German Home Front. (As an example, in 1914 Germany imported 67,981 pigs; in 1918, only 97 (Blum, M., (2011) 'Government decisions before and during the First World War and the living standards of Germany during a drastic natural experiment', *Explorations in Economic History*, Vol. 48, pp.556)).

Staff is successful in convincing me of the initiative shown by the German destroyer commanders in launching their torpedo attacks against the British battle line, but such initiative was mirrored by the Royal Navy at first light the following morning. It is as if Staff wants to change history, but can't; despite what he says, the High Seas Fleet did not inflict the damage it needed to do, and British naval superiority was maintained. Regardless of how well, or otherwise, the High Seas Fleet was handled, it remained an ineffective force throughout the war and, indeed, its poor morale in 1918 was a major contribution to Germany's defeat.

Finally, it is interesting to turn to the famous scientist, psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker who, in his book *A Sense of Style* (2014, Penguin Books), attacks the writing style of many military historians, picking on John Keegan, in particular, as a 'model of incoherent writing' (p.186). It would be in Gary Staff's interests to avoid catching Pinker's attention, or else he would be facing far more erudite criticism than mine.

SIGNAL PAD!

Naval Wargames Weekend 2017.

This event will be taking place in 2017 on the 8th & 9th of July from 10 am to 5 pm. The venue will be the same as usual, the Conference Room at Explosion! Museum in Gosport.

Unfortunately, this year the museum are not willing to host us for nothing so there will be an entry fee. This will be £5 for one day or £7.50 for both.

In return for this, not only do you get two days of naval wargaming, but free entry to the museum (normally £11). We are also planning, thanks to Nick Hewitt, to have a guided tour of the reserve collection (2 buildings not normally open to the public) on each afternoon.

Could anyone wishing/willing to put on a game for the weekend please send details (nature of game, space required, which day(s)) to Dave Sharp (dave_sharp@talktalk.net).

“RECON 2016”. Saturday 3rd December Pudsey Civic Hall, West Yorkshire.

“CRUSADE 2017”. Saturday 28th January 2017. South Wales’ 22nd Annual Wargames show, at a new venue, St Cyres School, Sully Road, Penarth CF64 2TP. Adults £4, children £1.

“Overlord 2017”. Abingdon Wargames Club presents its 20th Annual show, Sunday 5th March 2017. Fitzharry’s School, Northcourt Road, Abingdon, Berkshire, OX14 1NP. £3 Adults, £1 children.

JOINING THE NAVAL WARGAMES SOCIETY

If you have been lent this newsletter and would like to join the Naval Wargames Society, please follow this link to join our Society:

www.navalwargamessociety.org.

Membership secretary: simonjohnstokes@aol.com

NWS Events and Regional Contacts, 2016

NWS Northern Fleet – Falkirk East Central Scotland

Kenny Thomson, 12 Craigs Way, Rumford Grange, Rumford, Stirlingshire, FK2 0EU

Tel: 01324 714248

e-mail: kenny.thomson@hotmail.com - Website: <http://falkirkwargamesclub.org.uk/>

Falkirk Wargames Club meets each Monday night at 7pm with a variety of games running each evening. Naval games are popular with 2 or 3 run each month. Campaign games sometimes feature in our monthly weekend sessions. Games tend to be organised week to week making a 3-month forecast here a waste of time. Please get in touch if you’d like to come along.

- Popular periods – Modern (Shipwreck), WW1 and 2 (GQ), WW2 Coastal (Action Stations), and Pre-dreadnought (P Dunn’s rules)
-
-

Devon and the West Country

Naval Wargames afternoon/evening/all day on a regular basis.

Contact Stuart Barnes Watson to arrange the details.

stuart_barnes_watson@hotmail.com

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